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October 7, 2003

FBI Academy HRT Building Quantico, VA 22135 Attention: Ms Theresa Powell, Contract Specialist

RE: RFP # 0026791 Sample Rifle Phase | Deficiencies Resolution

Coming to you for arrival before the deadline of October 9, 2003 1500 hours is our Sample Rifle serial number FBI-0003 with deficiency corrections completed. This letter addresses the corrections or comments pertaining the deficiencies spelled out in your September 23 letter.

Letter section 1; MAGAZINE FLOOR PLATE OPENING DURING VARIOUS STAGES OF DROP TESTS #1, 2 & 3

While the change in the drop test "drop distance" may be sufficient to eliminate the floor plate opening on impact, we have significantly increased the spring tension strength in the floor plate latch to further prevent this from happening.

## WEAPON FIRING DURING THE MUZZLE IMPACT DROP TEST WITH THE SAFETY OFF AND ON THE TRIGGER GUARD WITH THE SAFETY OFF

This specification was impossible to meet and it was no surprise to any of us that all experienced failure. The FBI's willingness to decrease the drop distance from 4 feet to 2 feet, and to eliminate the SAFETY OFF condition in any orientation for this test confirms the impracticality of this test protocol. It is an engineering fact that the force generated from dropping a 15 pound weapon on the ground, much less concrete would likely cause a failure of the trigger/sear engagement to hold in the SAFETY OFF condition. This was clearly not an issue in any orientation in the SAFETY ON condition as there were no failures noted.

Because the two foot distance is less severe, and because all drops will be made with the weapon in the SAFETY ON condition, we have not made any alterations to the trigger sear engagement. Our testing indicates that the current mechanical design of the fire control can withstand this impact abuse. Furthermore, because the weapon did not discharge in the previous 4 foot drop in the SAFETY ON condition, there is no longer a deficiency with respect to our weapon as all discharges occurred in the SAFETY OFF condition.

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There is one noteworthy point with respect to the second round of abuse testing as specified by the FBI that needs to be stated. The weapon in question, FBI0003 was resubmitted to the FBI with corrections made to the deficient areas only which in this case was the magazine floorplate coming open when dropped. No other modifications or changes were made to any other components, parts etc. on this weapon as said parts already have proven to have maintained a satisfactory disposition in the previous, more severe abuse test. Our Firearms Product Manager, John Trull needed clarification from the FBI that the resubmission would be tested to evaluate correction to the noted deficiencies only. The obvious concern was that this weapon and its parts, components, etc. had been dropped a total of 18 times from a distance of 4 feet onto concrete to evaluate the absolute worst case abuse that the weapon may see over the course of its service life. For clarification purposes, Mr. Trull contacted Mr Lon Horiuchi of the FBI to discuss this issue. Mr. Horiuchi confirmed that the resubmission would be evaluated only for correction of the noted deficiencies from the first round of abuse testing. Any subsequent failures that may occur in areas other than the noted deficiencies from the first round of abuse testing would not count against the manufacturer as a deficiency in the second round. As an example, should a stock break in the second round of abuse testing as redefined by the FBI, this would not count as a deficiency as the stock had already passed the more severe abuse testing in the first round as was originally specified.

This leads me to an assumption we have made that I would like to clarify. FAR regulation 52.212-2 allows for a failure to occur and the manufacturer be given the opportunity to correct the problem and the product be re-tested under the same test criteria. In this case, the product experienced failure in two areas during the abuse test (drop test) as it was originally written in the RFP. We made an adjustment in one deficiency (the magazine floorplate) but in the other we did not as the change in test protocol rendered the weapon discharging in the SAFETY OFF condition irrelevant, as it was no longer a requirement in the new test. HOWEVER, the test and performance requirement has been changed. Thus, we are assuming that because the test is <u>different</u>, we are starting from ground zero on any failure point. Should the problem with the magazine floorplate latch again surface, we will again be given the ONE chance to correct the problem and be retested against the same test. Please verify if this assumption is correct or not.

Letter section 2,

## NOTATIONS FROM FBI SNIPERS

After reading the notations, we came to the conclusion that some or all of these notes were not about our rifle. Examples;

- We did not use a plastic follower on our product
- Current mag spring and follower are virtually identical to those we currently supply to the FBI for use in their rifles
- S Rounds loaded easily and no hang ups were experienced in our testing
- Disassembly, cleaning and re-assembly are again identical to what the current FBI guns offer and it is about as simple as it gets.
- Uncertain about the comment about the "magazine still a pain" indicates the gun being referenced had a removable box magazine (ours does not)

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- Loading is again based on current load process used by the FBI in current fifles and is about as simple as it gets.
- Uncertain about cheek piece issue movement to be defined
- · Bipod too high comment is confusing as we used the bipod specified by the RFP


With all of these irregularities, our Firearms Product Manager, John Trull, called for clarification from Mr. Lon Horiuchi. Mr. Horiuchi agreed that something seemed out of sorts and told John to regard these comments as information only as it appeared the gun notes might have been incorrectly assigned to our gun. Mr. Horiuchi stated that the FBI Sniper comments were not to be considered as deficiencies, but as points of information. Therefore, we have not made any modifications based on the comments because of the concern that some comments did not apply to our weapon and due to timing constraints. That being said, Remington would like to note that upon award of the contract, we are willing to work with the FBI to address any areas that can be improved upon from the perspective of the FBI Snipers. Remington has a great deal of resources, which can be readily applied to quickly resolve any areas that are deemed to be less than optimal by the FBI.

I hope we have addressed the issues presented in your September 23<sup>rd</sup>, letter. Please let me know if you need further clarification or information. We will await the results of the re-test of Phase 1 but are very confident that our product will pass without problems.

I have also signed the Amendment #5 notification and will be returning it along with this letter as well as faxed copies of everything to you. Rena Hamilton will follow up with you to insure receipt.

Thank you for your continued support of Remington Law Enforcement Products.

Sincerely,



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